How Bangladesh will benefit from Laldia project

Chattogram Port is the country's main gateway for imports and exports. About 99 percent of containerized cargo passes through this port. Beyond this, there is practically no alternative. So even a slight pressure on the port's capacity sends ripples across the entire foreign trade system. And we already know the gap between demand and capacity has been there for many years. The result is the long-standing congestion.

 

It doesn't take deep analysis to understand where the core problem lies. The existing terminals, especially the New Mooring Container Terminal, are operating at full capacity. Even if its management goes to a foreign operator, capacity won't suddenly jump because the physical structure isn't changing. And what about Laldia? This is where the biggest new container capacity can come in. Nearly eight hundred thousand TEUs of annual handling capacity will be added, which is enough to ease the current shortfall.

 

Here's something important to remember. A container isn't just a steel box; inside it sits the entire supply chain of the country's export-oriented industries-apparel, leather, pharmaceuticals, plastics, electronics, the sectors that keep Bangladesh running. The faster these goods enter and exit the port, the more competitive exporters remain. According to NBR, exports worth USD 4,226 crore moved through Chattogram Port in the last fiscal year. Once Laldia becomes operational, at least one-fourth of those exports are expected to move through that terminal. The additional revenue is one benefit, but the bigger gain is the acceleration of foreign trade.

 

 

Now, let's come to the outcry around the agreement. After the concession agreement between APM Terminals and the Chattogram Port Authority was signed on 17 November in Dhaka, the debate fared up. Some say a strategic state asset has been handed to foreigners. Others argue there is a lack of transparency. And there are protests on the streets. But if we think calmly, concession agreements are nothing unfamiliar. In ports, airports, highways-PPP agreements are now the standard model for infrastructure development around the world.

 

The essence of a concession agreement is simple: the government provides the land; the foreign company invests, builds, operates, collects charges and hands the entire infrastructure back to the government at the end of the term. Typically, the tenure is 25 to 30 years. Laldia's term is 33 years. A closer look shows that almost every country uses such long-term arrangements because building a major port is extremely expensive.

 

So where is the real problem? The issue is mostly about information disclosure. The Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) portion of the contract keeps commercial terms confidential. This is standard practice in the global port industry. But there is no obligation to keep non-commercial information secret. That's where the government's transparency could have been clearer. Countries like India have published more than 200 concession contracts. Though in India's port sector most of these deals are with local private operators, not foreign ones. There was similar controversy during the Red Sea Gateway agreement for Patenga. Yet this entire debate is missing the real question: Is there any alternative to building a new terminal? The answer is simple: No.

 

Demand is rising, but no new terminal will come before 2030. This means all additional pressure in the next several years will fall entirely on current capacity. Container congestion will worsen. Exports will be delayed. Ships will lose time and exporters ultimately bear that cost. Foreign trade becomes more expensive. In this reality, is it logical to build a new terminal quickly with foreign investment? Global experience says yes. Many countries are now handing the operations of major ports to private and foreign specialists. Companies like APM Terminals, PSA International and DP World have become key drivers of modernization, efficiency and growth in international ports. A few examples make this clear.

 

All these examples show one thing: foreign operation does not mean losing state control. The state actually gains more. They bring investment, enhance efficiency and modernize infrastructure. And the state gets revenue and the broader benefits of increased trade flow. The real question is not about handing over management; it's about how fast the port's capacity can grow.

 

Now let's look clearly at who gets what in the Laldia project and where the potential gains and losses lie. First comes the investment. APM Terminals, which has taken responsibility for construction and operation, is investing USD 550 million. With this money, they will handle land preparation, infrastructure construction, equipment procurement and operational setup. The government doesn't need to make any capital investment.

 

 

The first source of income for the port authority is the upfront fee. After signing the contract, they immediately received Tk 250 crore. It's a one-time income that helps tidy up the port's accounts at the outset. Next comes the per-container charge. For the first eight hundred thousand TEUs handled annually at Laldia, the port will receive USD 21 per TEU. Beyond that, the rate gradually increases-for example, from eight to nine hundred thousand TEUs, it will be USD 23 per unit. There is another upper tier whose rate hasn't been disclosed but the idea is obvious: the busier the terminal, the more the port earns.

 

Ship-berthing capacity is also a major part of the economics. Three ships can berth simultaneously at Laldia's three jetties. Over the roughly 30-year operation period, total potential earnings for the port-considering container handling shares, feeder vessel charges and all services from outer anchorage to jetty-could exceed USD 700 million.

 

The port authority's income is secure because they are not investing. APM, on the other hand, won't see returns for the first three years; the entire early-stage risk is theirs. Later, over thirty years, they will collect profit and ultimately hand the asset back to the government. Maersk will also benefit indirectly because ship-time loss will fall. Each day of delay costs them USD 10,000 to 15,000. With Laldia active, these losses will drop.

 

So what do we want? On one side stands waiting, congestion, inefficiency and rising costs. On the other side stands a new terminal, a quick solution, faster exports and stronger foreign trade. It's natural to have emotions around Chattogram Port. Concerns over state assets are also valid. But the reality is that major ports cannot be built without investment. And past experience raises doubt about whether the government alone can finish such a large project on time.

 

Debate around Laldia can continue. It should, because big decisions deserve questions. But the heart of the discussion must focus on the interest of national trade. And that interest is clear: a new terminal is needed now. A foreign operator is an opportunity, not a threat. If the project is completed on time, exporters will benefit, port revenue will rise, ship-time will be saved, and the entire economy will gain a new momentum.

 

If we truly want to see Chattogram emerge as a powerful logistics hub in South Asia, then Laldia is not just another project-it is a necessity of the moment.